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Lying just one mile off the eastern tip of the North Fork of Long
Island, at the gateway to the Peconic Bay Estuary, the 840-acre Plum
Island Animal Disease Center contains nearly 200,000 square feet of
biocontainment laboratory space, including 40 rooms for disease research
on large animals (primarily livestock). In a September 2003 report
titled "Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at
Plum Island Animal Disease Center," the United States Government
Accounting Office (GAO) identified significant ongoing environmental and
security lapses that could be exploited by terrorists for the purpose of
destabilizing the economy or harming human health and the environment.
In addition, a recent site assessment by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation confirmed the presence of 3 operational incinerators, 16 dump sites, 650,000 gallons of petroleum storage, an "extensive" underground fuel spill (undergoing some remediation), and a sewage treatment plant that is presently seeking to increase its discharge of treated waste to o 90,000 gallons per day. Since 1954, the Plum Island laboratory opened under the direction of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and has been involved in research focused on the diagnosis, vaccination and prevention of contagious animal diseases that have been identified in other countries, and which could result in significant economic impacts on the nation's livestock industry if introduced in the United States. Examples of the disease-causing germs or pathogens currently maintained at the facility include foot-and-mouth disease, African swine fever, monkey pox, camel pox and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. According to the GAO report at least two of the pathogens currently maintained at the facility have potential for further development as potential human biowarfare agents. Less dramatic, but no less significant is the fact that other animal pathogens maintained at the facility could wreak economic havoc if their security and containment was compromised by terrorists or inadvertent release in the region or in other parts of the country. Public concern about the future management and security of the facility has been underscored by the sensitivity of its nearby and bustling coastal environment. Lying at the gateway to the Peconic Bay Estuary, Plum Island is nearly adjacent to one of Long Island's busiest ferry terminals, most popular state parks, a commercial fishing dock and some of busiest fishing and pleasure boating waters in the region. According to the National Estuary Program's 1997 assessment of the Peconic Estuary Economy, approximately 1,000 local estuarine-related businesses (boating, fishing, restaurants, motel, outdoor recreation) are responsible for more than $400 million in annual revenues and $120 million in wages annually. As a result, the consequences of an accidental or criminal release of one or more of the contagious pathogens maintained on Plum Island could have wide ranging environmental, economic and public health implications for the region. Even if a release were contained, the ensuing media attention and public concern would likely have a devastating effect on local tourism, fishing, farming, hunting, winemaking, and many other sectors of the local economy. These are many of the same economic sectors that support regional efforts to advance the cause of conservation and land protection. Impacts to these sectors would only make the job of environmental protection more difficult to achieve. Recent attention to the operations and management of the Plum Island facility began shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Like many other federal laboratories, for many years, Plum Island's management was less conscious of the security implications of its work than it was on managing the safety of its individual research experiments. September 11th was a dramatic wake-up call for federal institutions nationwide and Plum Island quickly drew the attention of those charged with securing the homeland. Concern about the facility was further heightened when contract workers responsible for site operations went on strike in the summer of 2002 and provided additional insight into vulnerabilities at the facility. Moreover, the installment of less experienced replacement workers left many observers with the feeling that Plum Island would actually become more vulnerable to security breaches and inferior environmental management while the contract dispute lingered. These events, coupled with a series of new anti-terrorism laws and regulations, authorized the GAO to review security at Plum Island, and further required the U.S. Department of Agriculture to transfer overall responsibility for the lab to the newly-formed Department of Homeland Security by June of 2003. As a result, there is significant reason to believe that security and pathogen containment will become a higher priority for the facility. However, there is also reason to believe that the Department of Homeland Security has fairly significant number of priorities to manage and Plum Island may not be at the top of its list for immediate funding or action. From our standpoint, agreement on a specific timeline and funding for implementation of the GAO recommendations is critical to national security, as well as the health and welfare of local residents, the natural environment and the regional economy. It is, therefore, our goal to work with several other North Fork and South Fork organizations to develop a regional coalition that will campaign to assure adequate funding and an accelerated schedule for implementation of the security and biohazard improvements recommended by the GAO. Specifically, we will urge the Department of Homeland Security to utilize a portion of its recently-authorized $47 million dollar New York security allocation for 2004 to accelerate the improvements recommended for Plum Island. We will work with partner organizations to improve the facility's public reporting and information procedures. We will focus our attention not just on increasing the public's understanding of the facilities research-related hazards and management, but request a regular examination, reporting and compliance procedure related to the facility's wider operations including: water quality protection; sewage treatment; incineration; toxic and hazardous materials storage and remediation and wildlife management procedures. With regular reporting and full public disclosure and significant improvements in the facility's overall security procedures, Plum Island can likely continue in its important mission to safeguard the nation's livestock and help other countries in the diagnosis, and treatment of devastating animal diseases. If the facility cannot quickly improve is overall operations, the potential threats to our region if not our entire nation may well exceed the benefits of maintaining this facility for the future. The responsibility ultimately falls on the Federal government, and every member should make an effort to help us place this facility at the top of the Department of Homeland Security's security improvement list. What You Can Do: Contact these government officials: Susan K. Neely Asst. Secretary for Public Affairs US Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 Phone: 202-282-8000 James McMahon, Director Office of Public Security Executive Chamber 633 3rd Avenue ? 38th Floor New York, New York 10017 212-867-7060 info@security.state.ny.us Tell them you are aware of the Government Accounting Office assessment of Plum Island (September 2003) and that you request an accelerated safety and security upgrade plan with specific timeline completion that is consistent with the recommendations of the GAO report. Tell them that they should use a portion of the recent $47 million New York Security Allocation for 2004 to fund the improvements and that they should set up a formal Citizen Advisory Committee to improve the dialogue between the public and the lab. Contact these elected officials: Congressman Tim Bishop 3680 Route 112 ? Suite C Coram, New York 11727 Phone 631-696-6500 Fax: 631-696-4520 www.house.gov/timbishop Senator Hillary Clinton 476 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510-3204 Phone: 202-224-4451 Fax: 202-228-0282 www.clinton.senate.gov Email: senator@clinton.senate.gov Senator Charles Schumer 313 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510-3203 Phone: 202-224-6542 Fax: 202-228-3027 www.schumer.senate.gov Email: senator@schumer.senate.gov Thank them for their concern about the safety and security concerns and Plum Island and ask them to support an accelerated safety and security upgrade plan with specific timeline completion that is consistent with the recommendations of the GAO report. Encourage them to support the use of a portion of the recent $47 million Department of Homeland Security New York Security Allocation for 2004" to fund the improvements and ask them to set up a formal Citizen Advisory Committee to improve the dialogue between the public and the lab. |
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